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Little is known about how humans solve the exploitation/exploration trade-off. In particular,
the evidence for uncertainty-driven exploration is mixed.The current study proposes a novel
hypothesis of exploration that helps reconcile prior findings that may seem contradictory
at first. According to this hypothesis, uncertainty-driven exploration involves a dilemma
between two motives: (i) to speed up learning about the unknown, which may beget novel
reward opportunities; (ii) to avoid the unknown because it is potentially dangerous. We
provide evidence for our hypothesis using both behavioral and simulated data, and briefly
point to recent evidence that the brain differentiates between these two motives.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Learning to choose between multiple unknown prospects, in the
hope of eventually exploiting the most rewarding ones, is a diffi-
cult yet fundamental problem. It involves a trade-off between two
competing courses of action: to exploit known options that are
believed to yield the best outcomes versus to explore unknown
alternatives that may be even more rewarding.
Little is known about how humans solve this trade-off. In par-
ticular, the determinants of exploratory decisions remain under-
specified. In the model-free reinforcement learning framework,
exploration is undirected, i.e., it boils down to introducing anneal-
ing in the choice rule, whereby the agent either periodically
chooses at random, or increases stochasticity of choice when
options have similar estimated values (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
A more efficient strategy may consist of directing exploration to
those options about which the agent is most uncertain about the
expected value (e.g., Gittins and Jones, 1974; Kakade and Dayan,
2002; Huettel et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007). Whether individuals
implement such uncertainty-driven exploration remains an open
question.
The existing evidence for uncertainty-driven exploration is
mixed. Recently, (Frank et al., 2009) found that participants in a
reward learning task were“ambiguity seekers,” i.e., they strategically
explored the least well known options, with large individual dif-
ferences that varied as a function of prefrontal cortex genetic func-
tion. In a follow-up imaging study (Badre et al., 2012) revealed the
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) to signal estimation uncer-
tainty only in the participants identified as ambiguity seekers.
Furthermore, Cavanagh et al. (2011) showed with EEG that these
uncertainty signals are represented prior to the decision, which
further suggests they drive ambiguity seeking choice. However,
these results may appear at odds with the ample evidence, from
Allais (1953) to Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011), that indi-
viduals direct exploration to the least uncertain options, thereby
shying away from coping with the unknown (“ambiguity aver-
sion”). A neurobiological foundation for ambiguity aversion has
recently been laid (see, e.g., Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel et al., 2006;
Levy et al., 2010).
The current study attempts to reconcile these findings. As noted
by Cavanagh et al. (2011) and Badre et al. (2012), the phenome-
non of ambiguity aversion could be parasitic on sticky choice – the
behavioral pattern consisting in repeating the same choice regard-
less of reward statistics. The idea is that would the agent preferen-
tially choose the options he repeatedly chose in the past, he may
behave this way either because he is ambiguity averse (those repeat-
edly sampled options are the least uncertain), or merely because
he tends to stick to prior choices. A related concern is that unless
modeled explicitly, sticky choice makes it hard to identify any
positive influence of estimation uncertainty on exploration. How-
ever, sticky choice appeared to be a second-order phenomenon
in Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts’s (2011) task. Besides, the evi-
dence for ambiguity aversion documented in Payzan-LeNestour
and Bossaerts (2011) still prevailed after accounting for sticky
choice in the behavioral models used in that study, which rules
out the possibility that such ambiguity averse behavior merely be
“sticky choice in disguise1.”
1Specifically, the data reported in Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011) were fitted
by a model allowing for both modulation of exploration by ambiguity (ambiguity-
seeking or ambiguity-averse – see Results Section for details on the functional forms)
and stickiness in choice (i.e., choice probability is biased towards the latest chosen
option, with the biasing factor being a free parameter). The value of the weight on
the ambiguity component turned out to be negative for the majority (60 out of 62)
of the subjects, which implies ambiguity aversion.
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The current study proposes a novel hypothesis about explo-
ration that helps reconcile the findings of Payzan-LeNestour
and Bossaerts (2011) and Frank et al. (2009)/Cavanagh et al.
(2011)/Badre et al. (2012; henceforth, FCB). According to this
hypothesis, uncertainty-driven exploration involves a dilemma
between two motives: (i) to speed up learning about the unknown,
which may beget novel reward opportunities; (ii) to avoid the
unknown because it is potentially dangerous. The first motive is
connected with the notion of curiosity (van Dijk and Zeelenberg,
2007) whereas the second is connected with cautiousness. Below
we will briefly point to recent evidence that the brain differenti-
ates between these two motives. We argue that in the task used
in FCB, both motives prevailed, though behavior was only influ-
enced by the first motive, which dominated the second one. The
second motive was somewhat muted because the potential mone-
tary losses in that task were relatively small, especially compared to
those in the task used in Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011),
where the payoffs were highly skewed. The two motives were –
arguably – equally important in that task. This claim may seem
strange at first: that ambiguity aversion prevailed would rather
suggest that the second motive dominated, i.e., that the cautionary
signal not to bet on things unknown countervailed the directive
to sharpen the learning about the unknown. But the current study
shows that our subjects were in fact both ambiguity averse and
novelty seekers.
We flesh out new explanations of subject behavior in Payzan-
LeNestour and Bossaerts’s (2011) task, a restless (Wittle, 1988)
multi-armed bandit in which reinforcement contingencies jumped
at unsignaled times. In this kind of changing environment, the
directive to speed up learning is primarily relayed through unex-
pected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005) signals: when jump
likelihood is high (i.e., unexpected uncertainty is great), the
motivation to explore to find out novel reward opportunities
ought to be maximal. We fitted to subject behavior in the task
a new model that allows trial-by-trial estimates of both esti-
mation uncertainty and unexpected uncertainty. This model
assumes that the agent, in addition to directing exploration to
the options for which estimation uncertainty is minimal, also
directs exploration to the options for which unexpected uncer-
tainty is maximal. This model markedly improved the fit of the
previously developed ambiguity averse model, which Payzan-
LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011) found to be the best fit to
behavior in the task. This finding shows that in our experi-
ment, unexpected uncertainty modulated the “curiosity motive”
(i), while estimation uncertainty modulated the “cautiousness
motive” (ii).
We also show with simulated data that the behavior consist-
ing of mixing ambiguity aversion with novelty seeking is natural
viewed from the evolutionary fitness principle. We conducted
a number of simulations of behavior in the foregoing restless
bandit task, in order to compare economic performance of a vari-
ety of models that allowed alternate kinds of uncertainty-driven
exploration (specifically, ambiguity seeking, ambiguity aversion,
novelty seeking, and a mixture of the latter two). Our simulated
data reveal ambiguity aversion to improve economic performance
in the task compared to ambiguity seeking. This result ques-
tions the standard claim that ambiguity aversion [i.e., motive
(ii) in the above dilemma] is irrational. We further found that
the behavior that mixes ambiguity aversion with novelty seek-
ing fared best in the task. This suggests that both stated motives
(i) and (ii) can be vindicated on the grounds of evolutionary
fitness.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. EXPERIMENTAL TASK
The current study builds on the restless bandit task originally
described in Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011) as well as
Payzan-LeNestour (2012), where full task details are provided2. In
what follows we focus on the task features relevant for the current
study.
The task is a six-armed bandit. Three arms are blue and three
are red. Color is visible. At each trial, every arm generates one of
three possible outcomes: 1, −1, or 0 CHF3 for the blue arms; 2,
−2, or 0 CHF for the red arms. At each trial, the agent selects one
arm and immediately receives the outcome returned by the chosen
arm. He is not told the outcomes returned by the other arms.
Our bandit is restless: while absolute expected value is con-
stant for each arm, the sign of expected value occasionally flips,
thus arms switch from having positive to negative expectation
and back. The flips in the outcome probabilities occur without
notice. Specifically, changes are instantiated with two indepen-
dent Bernoulli processes, one for the blue arms and one for the
red. For each process and at each trial, either “jump” or “no jump”
occurs. When jump occurs for one of the two colors, then at the
three arms of this color, the probabilities of two outcomes flip.
Jump frequency is higher for the red arms than for the blue ones
(1/4 versus 1/16), whereby unexpected uncertainty is higher for
the red arms on average.
The subject knows that outcome probabilities will change with-
out warning during the experiment (he also knows red arms are
more unstable but is not told the jump probabilities), which leads
him to track unexpected uncertainty throughout the task, as we
show elsewhere (Payzan-LeNestour et al., in preparation). The
same study reveals subjects to track estimation uncertainty as
well. One distinctive characteristic of our design is that the lev-
els of both estimation uncertainty and unexpected uncertainty
vary substantially during the task. Unexpected uncertainty lev-
els vary from high, upon jumps, to low, during the stable phases.
Also, because learning has to be reset after each jump, estima-
tion uncertainty remains significant throughout the task. This
manipulation renders the trial-by-trial estimation of both uncer-
tainty components meaningful. Importantly, participants in our
task did estimate these components, contrary to that in prior
studies where unexpected uncertainty appeared to be artifactu-
ally maximal throughout the task (e.g., Daw et al., 2006; Jepma
and Nieuwenhuis, 2011)4.
2Payzan-LeNestour (2012) is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1628657.
3Swiss Francs, the currency used in the original experiment.
4In these studies, the analysis suggests that participants presumed changes in the
reward contingencies would occur at each trial during the task, perhaps because the
task instructions were vague about the nature of the changes in the reward con-
tingencies, and in the absence of knowledge, the “worst-case scenario” (maximal
instability) is imagined.
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2.2. COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
The current study augments the Bayesian model described in
Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011). Here we briefly point
to the essentials of that model. The model learns the outcome
probabilities of the six arms through a natural sampling scheme
(analogous to the one proposed in Hirayama et al. (2004, 2006)
and Quinn and Karny (2007) which exponentially discounts (“for-
gets”) the past outcomes returned by a given arm after discovering
the arm has jumped. A key feature of the model is that the dis-
count factor is adjusted on the spot on each trial T. It equals the
likelihood that no jump occurred at trial T, i.e., it quantifies the
“confidence in stability” at trial T. Since jumps are color-specific in
the task, the model uses two discount factors, one for the red arms,
λred(T ), and one for the blue, λblue(T ). λred(T ) (resp. λblue(T )) is
thus proportional to the strength of evidence that red arms (resp.
blue arms) did not change at trial T.
Exponential discounting of the past has the appealing property
of being related to leaky-integration processes, which have been
commonly used to model neuronal dynamics in a changing envi-
ronment (e.g., Sugrue et al., 2004). So this kind of “forgetting
Bayesian” model is both a good descriptive model of behav-
ior (as shown in Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011) and a
good model of neuronal dynamics (as argued in Yu and Cohen,
2009)5.
For each arm i and at each trial T, the model computes
Q(i,T ), the expected value (i.e., the sum of the three possible
outcomes weighted by their estimated probabilities of occur-
rence). The model thus assumes participants were risk neutral
and did not distort the outcome probabilities, which is at odds
with a number of theories (e.g., Prospect Theory). The motiva-
tion for this modeling choice is both parsimony and agnosti-
cism about whether/how individuals actually distort probabilities
(which reflects disagreement in the literature6).
Action selection in the task is modeled with the softmax rule.
According to this rule,option i is chosen with probability PiT which
is proportional to the exponential of the value of arm i:
PiT ∝ expβQi,T .
β (the inverse temperature) is a free parameter controlling the
degree to which the subject makes exploitative choices versus
exploratory ones.
Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011) report that their
behavioral data were best fit with the assumption that subjects
tracked the level of estimation uncertainty of the options, in order
to strategically explore options with minimal estimation uncer-
tainty on a given trial. Such ambiguity averse behavior is accom-
plished by subtracting from the Q-value entering the softmax rule
5Alternate Bayesian schemes could do as well. For instance, eraspou proposes a
“Hierarchical Bayesian”model that is equally good at learning outcome probabilities
in the current task, compared to the forgetting Bayesian approach. The probability
estimates of the two models are strongly correlated. The forgetting Bayesian model
is more tractable and particularly suitable for our purpose in the current analysis.
6E.g., Trommershäuser et al. (2008) report that subjects in a movement task repre-
sented probabilities in a way that was close to perfect (no distortion whatsoever).
By contrast Hertwig et al. (2003) document underweighting of the probability of
occurrence of rare events, which is at odds with Prospect Theory which states
overweighting.
an exploration “malus” proportional to the level of estimation
uncertainty:
QiT ← QiT − euiT ,
where euiT is the level of estimation uncertainty about option i
at trial T, quantified in terms of the width (variance or entropy)
of the posterior probability distribution tracked by the Bayesian
learner (cf.Yoshida and Ishii,2006; Behrens et al., 2007 and Payzan-
LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011). The width of the distribution
reflects the subject’s uncertainty regarding option value. Early in
learning, the width is larger (and uncertainty higher) than later is
learning.
The alternate “ambiguity seeking” model assumes that sub-
jects guided exploration toward the options for which estimation
uncertainty was maximal, whereby they explored the least well
known options. This behavior is instantiated by adding to the Q-
value an exploration bonus proportional to the level of estimation
uncertainty:
QiT ← QiT + euiT .
The two previous models modulate exploration as a function of
estimation uncertainty. We also developed a model featuring a
novel kind of uncertainty-driven exploration, to formalize the
idea – previously suggested by Cohen et al. (2007) – that explo-
ration ought to be modulated by unexpected uncertainty. Specif-
ically, when reinforcement contingencies change abruptly over
time, survival depends on constant adaptation to such changes.
This adaptation requires that the agent increases exploration when
he deems the environment to be novel (i.e., when unexpected
uncertainty is high), in accordance with our stated motive (i)
above. We refer to this behavior as “novelty seeking” (to be dis-
tinguished from ambiguity seeking as previously defined). In the
context of our multi-armed bandit task, the novelty seeking model
directs exploration to the arms that have most probably changed.
What follows describes how this behavior is accomplished. With-
out loss of generality, suppose the arm that is tried out at trial T is
a red one. The model adds to the value of the two red options not
currently sampled an exploration bonus proportional to the level
of unexpected uncertainty:
Q (i, T )← Q (i, T )+ (1− λred (T )) ,
where 1− λred(T ) is the level of unexpected uncertainty about
the red options at trial T, quantified in terms of the likelihood
that red options did change at trial T. To further increase novelty
seeking after a jump has been detected, the model also penal-
izes the value of the arm that is currently tried out, in propor-
tion to the level of unexpected uncertainty at the current trial:
Q(i,T )←Q(i,T )− (1− λred(T )).
According to the hypothesis stated in the Introduction, both
motives (i) and (ii) influence exploratory decisions. To reflect
this, the “hybrid model” combines ambiguity aversion and nov-
elty seeking by modifying the Q-value of the two red options not
currently sampled as follows:
Q (i, T )← Q (i, T )− euiT + (1− λred (T )) ,
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while the value of the arm that is currently tried out is modified
as follows: Q(i,T )←Q(i,T )− euiT− (1− λred(T )). This hybrid
model is the readout of the aforementioned dilemma in the con-
text of the current task: unexpected uncertainty modulates motive
(i) while estimation uncertainty modulates motive (ii).
Note that the foregoing models put equal weight on the Q-value
and uncertainty components. The motivation for this particular
modeling choice is parsimony; the relative weights can be changed
without changing the essence of the schemes. Specifically, to ensure
that our results are robust, for each of the four models above,
we tested several alternate models that have a different relative
weighting on the Q-value component vis-a-vis the uncertainty
component(s). These alternative models led to similar results.
2.3. EVALUATING MODEL FIT TO BEHAVIORAL DATA
We fitted the two new models introduced by the current study
(the novelty seeker and hybrid models) to the choice data of
Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011), using maximum likeli-
hood estimation. Only one parameter (the inverse temperature
β) needed to be estimated. We allowed this estimated parameter
to vary across participants. We compared the log-likelihoods of
each model to the one of the ambiguity averse model (the best
fit in Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011) which we use as
benchmark here.
2.4. EVALUATING MODEL FITNESS IN SIMULATED DATA
We compared the average fitness of the ambiguity averse, ambi-
guity seeking, novelty seeker, and hybrid models, in a set of 500
simulations of the task, each comprised of 500 trials (the length
of our experimental sessions). Here the gage of fitness is the eco-
nomic performance, i.e., the money accumulated in the 500 trials
of the task, averaged across the 500 simulations. For each model,
we ran the set of 500 simulations for different values of β, which
allowed us to assess the fitness as a function of β.
3. RESULTS
3.1. BEHAVIORAL
The novelty seeker model fitted choices better than the bench-
mark (ambiguity averse model) in the vast majority (95%) of
the participants. A paired t-test based on the difference between
the negative log-likelihoods of the benchmark and novelty seeker
models leads to the conclusion that the novelty seeker model fitted
subject behavior better than the benchmark (p< 0.001; N = 62).
For 82% of the participants, the hybrid model fitted subject behav-
ior better than the novelty seeker model. The former significantly
outperformed the latter according to a paired t -test (p< 0.001).
Figure 1 reports the negative log-likelihood of the hybrid model,
related to that of the benchmark.
3.2. SIMULATIONS
Figure 2 shows that in our simulations, the ambiguity averse model
performed uniformly better than not only the ambiguity seeking
model but also the model that excludes any kind of modulation
of exploration by uncertainty (“base model”7). The novelty seeker
7While the superiority of the ambiguity-averse model over the ambiguity-seeker
model appears to be robust to the use of different weighting on the Q-value rel-
ative to the uncertainty component in the decision rule, the superiority of the
FIGURE 1 | Comparative fits of the ambiguity averse and hybrid
models. The comparison of the fits is based on the negative log-likelihood
(-LL) criterion. Each data point corresponds to one subject (500 samples on
average per subject). The hybrid model fits better when the data point is
below the 45˚ line.
model outperformed the ambiguity averse model, and the hybrid
model performed best overall. The standard error of the economic
performance is of the same order of magnitude across all models.
4. DISCUSSION
Both the behavioral and simulated data reported here support the
hypothesis stated in the Introduction. Specifically, the evidence
suggests that individuals seek to uncover novel reward opportuni-
ties [“curiosity motive” (i)] while they also tend to shy away from
the unknown [“cautiousness motive” (ii)], and that this behavior
is adaptive, at least in the context of the present task.
Note the ways the task used in the current study is atypical in
comparison to previous tasks that were used to study exploration
(Daw et al., 2006, FCB). In our task, the dynamic contingencies
induced unexpected uncertainty about the value of unexplored
options. Unexpected uncertainty and estimation uncertainty did
vary significantly throughout the task and participants could esti-
mate them on each trial. This allowed the identification of an unex-
pected uncertainty bonus together with an estimation uncertainty
“malus”in subject exploration. By contrast, in an environment that
is unexpected uncertainty free, i.e., when the reinforcement con-
tingencies are stationary (like in the task used in FCB), estimation
uncertainty modulates both motives (i) and (ii), and behavior is
the readout of the dominating motive [arguably (i) in FCB]. Per-
haps cautiousness was muted in FCB because participants knew
they would not lose much money by exploring. Additionally, as
suggested in Cavanagh et al. (2011), the motivation to learn should
be maximal when the agent knows he can potentially suppress
ignorance, which is in principle the case when things are stable. In
contrast, when things change all the time, motive (i) is probably
dampened since the “returns on learning” are low.
ambiguity-averse model over the base model is not. Specifically, in our simulations,
the ambiguity-averse model that puts a minimal weight on the Q-value (i.e., that
tends to focus on the uncertainty component exclusively) did not outperform the
base model.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 150 | 4
Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts Uncertainty-driven exploration
FIGURE 2 | Economic performances of models featuring different
kinds of uncertainty-driven exploration, as a function of the
inverse temperature. Each point reports the economic performance
averaged across 500 simulations of 500 trials each. Performance is
measured by the amount of money accumulated till the 500th trial
(“final gain”). X-axis: β parameter (inverse temperature in the softmax
rule). Y-axis: average final gain across 500 simulations. Star (*):
performance of the ambiguity seeker model. Circle (o): performance of
the ambiguity averse model. Dot (.): performance of the novelty seeker
model. Cross (×): performance of the hybrid model. The hybrid model
combines ambiguity aversion and novelty seeking as described in the
main text. Dashed line: performance of the base model in which there
is no uncertainty-driven exploration (for reference). Vertical bars
represent standard errors.
Strikingly, the dilemma we describe here has been overlooked
in prior work in decision neuroscience and machine learning, on
the grounds that exploration should be exclusively driven by the
directive to find out more (e.g., Gittins and Jones, 1974; Kakade
and Dayan, 2002). Yet, the motive to not bet on the unknown,
which is perceived as potentially dangerous, may be equally – if
not more – important for survival. Our simulated data point to
this possibility: the ambiguity averse model fared better than the
ambiguity seeker model in our task. Also, the finding that the ambi-
guity averse model (let alone the novelty seeker and hybrid models)
performed better than the primary model, which excludes any
kind of modulation of exploration by uncertainty, should caution
the generally accepted view in classical decision theory (Savage,
1954) that uncertainty-driven exploration is irrational. For stan-
dard valuation theory, any sensitivity to uncertainty is irrational in
that it violates one of the most fundamental principles of rational
decision making, namely the sure thing principle8. Our results con-
tradict this view. We find that in the context of natural sampling,
being sensitive to uncertainty appears to be beneficial. This may be
8According to the sure thing principle, if the agent would take a certain action if he
knew that an event E obtained, and also if he knew that the negation of E obtained,
then he should take that action even if he knows nothing about E.
the reason why humans display such sensitivity, even if this gen-
erates choice inconsistencies in other contexts (e.g., the Ellsberg
Paradox ; Ellsberg, 1961). Humans can afford to be “irrational”
as long as this shows up only in ecologically irrelevant contexts
(like the gambles underlying the Ellsberg Paradox?), and as long
as it is adaptive in ecologically relevant contexts (like our natural
sampling task).
That ambiguity aversion may play a positive role, in avoid-
ing danger, has been suggested (albeit implicitly) in Hsu et al.
(2005), where amygdala was found to encode ambiguity, pre-
sumably through “fear signals.” Also, the current evidence that
unexpected uncertainty induces novelty seeking in the action
selection rule, together with prior evidence that unexpected
uncertainty plays a key role in value updating (e.g., Behrens
et al., 2007 and Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011), sug-
gests that unexpected uncertainty plays a dual role, as a mod-
ulator of learning as well as of action selection. This implies
new challenges and opportunities for neurobiological studies.
One can envisage unexpected uncertainty to influence learn-
ing through the neuromodulator norepinephrine, while it biases
choice through changes in serotonin levels. The former would
be consistent with Hasselmo (1999), Yu and Dayan (2005),
Rutishauser et al. (2006); the latter would be related to Doya
(2008).
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